

**Response to Questions from the Washington State Commission on Debt,
from the Meeting of October 21, 2011.**

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I. Comparing Census and Moody's Measures of the Highest Debt States Measured in Per Capita Terms

At the Commission meeting on October 21, we presented comparisons of two alternative measures of the top ten highest per capita debt states, one based on Census Bureau data and the other on Moody's data. In that presentation, the Census data came from 2007, whereas the Moody's data from 2010. Treasurer McIntire requested that 2007 data from Moody's be used to improve comparability.

The revised table is below. The conclusions are not changed. Washington is 5th by one Census measure and 16th by the other; whereas, Washington is 8th by the 2007 Moody's measure (Washington was 7th by the 2010 Moody's measure). The highest debt states tend to be the same regardless of the breadth of the debt measure. Of the 10 states listed by Moody's based on net tax supported debt, eight also appear in the list of the 10 states with highest state and local government long-term debt, as measured by the Census Bureau. Of the 10 states listed by Moody's based on net tax supported debt, seven also appear in the list of the ten states with highest state government long-term debt excluding private purposes, as measured by the Census Bureau.

Top Ten States, Alternative Measures of Outstanding Debt

2007 Per Capita State and Local All Long-term Debt	2007 Per Capita State Government Only Long-term Debt Excluding Private Purpose	2007 Per Capita State Government Only Long-term Net Tax-Supported Debt
<i>Census</i>	<i>Census</i>	<i>Moody's</i>
Alaska	Massachusetts	Massachusetts
Massachusetts	Hawaii	Connecticut
New York	New Jersey	Hawaii
Rhode Island	New York	New Jersey
Washington	Connecticut	New York
Colorado	Rhode Island	Delaware
New Jersey	Alaska	Illinois
Connecticut	Delaware	Washington
California	South Carolina	Rhode Island
Illinois	Louisiana	California
	Washington (16)	

II. Regression Analysis of State Government (only) Debt and Relative Position of Washington State

Treasurer McIntire also requested a regression analysis of interstate per capita debt levels that only examines state government debt. Our debt analysis (as opposed to analysis of new bond issues in 2008 – 2010) is based on Census Bureau data over the period 1992 to 2007. In this approach, a variable is included to represent every state except Washington. A positive (and statistically significant) coefficient on any state's dummy variable indicates whether that state has more debt relative to Washington, after adjustment for the differences in the economic, social, and political variables between those states. Similarly, a negative (and statistically significant) coefficient indicates that debt in that state is less than that in Washington, after adjustment for the differences in the economic, social, and political variables between those states.

The full regression results are on the following page. The states with positive coefficients (and statistically significant) on the dummy variable – indicating states that have greater per capita debt than Washington after adjustment for the differences in the economic, social, and political variables between those states – are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. All of these states, except New Hampshire and Vermont, also appear in the simple lists of states with per capita debt above or about the same level as Washington. Through this analysis, it appears that Washington has the 11th highest per capita debt, again adjusting for economic, social, and political differences in circumstances.

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. regress StateDebt LagStateDebt LocRevPer PerAge65 PerK12Enr Lib100CitId RealGSPPC FedRevPC Unemp BalPerExp DbtLimAmt No
> RevSpdLimit D2002 D2007 AL AK AZ AR CO CA CT DE FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM
> NY NC ND OH OK OR PN RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VI WV WI Wy, vce(robust)

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Linear regression

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Number of obs = 150
F( 62, 87) = 146.84
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.9624
Root MSE = 514.6

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StateDebt	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
LagStateDebt	.0067658	.1979054	0.03	0.973	-.3865927	.4001242
LocRevPer	-11.12304	17.90477	-0.62	0.536	-46.7107	24.46462
PerAge65	12.82499	177.9664	0.07	0.943	-340.9024	366.5524
PerK12Enr	-13.23038	48.79849	-0.27	0.787	-110.2227	83.7619
Lib100CitId	1.605558	8.133186	0.20	0.844	-14.56003	17.77115
RealGSPPC	-44.60534	40.1771	-1.11	0.270	-124.4617	35.251
FedRevPC	169.3902	555.9502	0.30	0.761	-935.6211	1274.402
Unemp	47.25881	83.85707	0.56	0.575	-119.4162	213.9338
BalPerExp	-13.98601	9.352649	-1.50	0.138	-32.57541	4.603395
DbtLimAmt	-110.7904	200.6713	-0.55	0.582	-509.6464	288.0656
NoRevSpdLi~t	320.3085	239.182	1.34	0.184	-155.0916	795.7085
D2002	564.2114	224.6835	2.51	0.014	117.6287	1010.794
D2007	1361.102	394.2035	3.45	0.001	577.5797	2144.624
AL	-1988.719	657.8123	-3.02	0.003	-3296.192	-681.2456
AK	7044.871	2229.232	3.16	0.002	2614.031	11475.71
AZ	-1561.437	656.0275	-2.38	0.019	-2865.363	-257.5116
AR	-2305.586	813.733	-2.83	0.006	-3922.968	-688.2036
CO	-439.23	620.8036	-0.71	0.481	-1673.144	794.6843
CA	-362.7568	379.0327	-0.96	0.341	-1116.125	390.6118
CT	4282.121	1025.554	4.18	0.000	2243.721	6320.522
DE	3908.296	1252.904	3.12	0.002	1418.014	6398.579
FL	-1479.71	1188.632	-1.24	0.217	-3842.245	882.8241
GA	-1721.264	499.516	-3.45	0.001	-2714.107	-728.4223
HI	2110.514	1215.863	1.74	0.086	-306.1455	4527.173
ID	-924.2462	531.5313	-1.74	0.086	-1980.722	132.2297
IL	191.5699	461.7457	0.41	0.679	-726.1998	1109.339
IN	-847.689	473.786	-1.79	0.077	-1789.39	94.01196
IA	-1261.565	817.1469	-1.54	0.126	-2885.733	362.603
KS	-1902.719	752.5488	-2.53	0.013	-3398.491	-406.9468
KY	-1148.9	625.9274	-1.84	0.070	-2392.999	95.19825
LA	-395.2031	301.1387	-1.31	0.193	-993.7488	203.3427
ME	226.0852	611.2692	0.37	0.712	-988.8785	1441.049
MD	-220.3501	290.8375	-0.76	0.451	-798.4212	357.7209
MA	5709.231	1378.746	4.14	0.000	2968.824	8449.637
MI	-637.3634	361.4898	-1.76	0.081	-1355.864	81.13677
MN	-1416.577	401.3305	-3.53	0.001	-2214.265	-618.8889
MS	-1649.44	663.9585	-2.48	0.015	-2969.129	-329.7504
MO	-393.8293	460.567	-0.86	0.395	-1309.256	521.5976
MT	624.0031	656.5151	0.95	0.345	-680.8917	1928.898
NE	-1632.147	684.0192	-2.39	0.019	-2991.709	-272.5846
NV	-149.9833	259.3921	-0.58	0.565	-665.5533	365.5866
NH	2714.242	990.032	2.74	0.007	746.4465	4682.038
NJ	2206.395	609.6382	3.62	0.000	994.6728	3418.117
NM	-574.1704	554.896	-1.03	0.304	-1677.086	528.7455
NY	2358.215	757.6405	3.11	0.003	852.3224	3864.108
NC	-1309.543	406.5848	-3.22	0.002	-2117.674	-501.412
ND	-684.9353	738.4807	-0.93	0.356	-2152.746	782.875
OH	-1269.268	484.7924	-2.62	0.010	-2232.845	-305.6904
OK	-1078.613	633.3247	-1.70	0.092	-2337.414	180.189
OR	-481.7916	405.2654	-1.19	0.238	-1287.3	323.7172
PN	-1198.666	804.5653	-1.49	0.140	-2797.827	400.4941
RI	3996.603	1051.01	3.80	0.000	1907.606	6085.6
SC	-322.4777	420.6406	-0.77	0.445	-1158.546	513.591
SD	414.2806	586.4707	0.71	0.482	-751.3935	1579.955
TN	-2115.016	613.6208	-3.45	0.001	-3334.654	-895.3786
TX	-1530.828	431.5593	-3.55	0.001	-2388.599	-673.0573
UT	-615.5746	571.664	-1.08	0.285	-1751.819	520.6695
VT	1135.177	679.7398	1.67	0.099	-215.8789	2486.234
VI	-712.1332	350.6197	-2.03	0.045	-1409.028	-15.23864
WV	-1072.041	863.2224	-1.24	0.218	-2787.789	643.7073
WI	155.4047	397.599	0.39	0.697	-634.8663	945.6757
Wy	-356.0514	495.4646	-0.72	0.474	-1340.841	628.7381
_cons	3603.435	2188.477	1.65	0.103	-746.3997	7953.269

III. Objective Reasons for a State to Spend More in Debt Financing

Treasurer McIntire also asked whether the data show if there are objective reasons (not political) for the state to spend more or less in debt financing. The statistically significant coefficients on economic variables in the regression analysis suggest one possible approach to this query.

In examining only state debt in the previous regression, we find no statistically significant influences besides state-specific effects described above and a growth in state debt across all states from 1997, to 2002, to 2007. Extending the regression analysis of debt through 2007 to include both state and local governments shows two additional economic factors that seem significantly related to debt. First, a larger fraction of the population enrolled in public schools is associated with greater per capita state-local debt. Second, greater revenue from the federal government is associated with less per capita state-local debt, which suggests that state and local governments see debt and federal aid as substitutes.

The regression analysis of state government borrowing during the 2008 – 2010 period identifies three objective economic factors that contribute to greater per capita borrowing. First, a larger fraction of the population enrolled in public schools is associated with greater per capita borrowing. Second, greater state GSP (income) is associated with greater per capita borrowing. Third, states with greater relative fiscal balances tended to borrow less.

Combining all of these results, one can begin to see several objective economic reasons for a state to borrow more or incur more debt:

(1) A state might borrow more to serve the K-12 public school population, either to adjust to growing enrollments or to replace older, depreciating facilities.

(2) Higher income states seem likely to borrow more or have higher debt simply because they also have higher amounts of public spending. If residents have relatively high incomes, they demand relatively more public services, which requires more public infrastructure.

(3) Third, states might borrow more or incur more debt if they have relatively lower alternative revenues, including relatively low federal aid and low state fiscal reserves relative to the budget.

IV. Use Regression Analysis to Show Influence of Local Debt Issues on State Debt Issues

Finally, Treasurer McIntire asked whether our statistical analysis could say anything about how the issuance of local debt in a state influences state debt. We interpret this as the suggestion to run the same regression analysis as reported above, but include another explanatory variable that would measure the amount of local debt activity in a state.

We regret to say that in order to do this appropriately; we would need to account for the fact that the amount of local debt in a state is endogenously determined with the amount of state debt in a state. That is, the same explanatory variables used in the above regression explain both state debt and local debt. A more advanced regression analysis (two-stage least squares) is necessary to account for this (to yield results with any confidence) and it requires the finding of multiple, measurable factors across all states that determine the amount of debt issued by local governments and that do not determine the amount of debt issued by state governments. We have concluded that such measures are not readily available and thus we cannot fulfill the Treasurer's request on this.